Trial and Appellate Practice: Final Examination (First Semester 1972-73) by William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Exams: 1944-1973 Faculty and Deans
1972
Trial and Appellate Practice: Final Examination
(First Semester 1972-73)
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1972 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/exams
Repository Citation





TRIAL AJ.\"D APPELLATE PRACTICE 
First Semester 1972-73 
Limit your answer to each question to not more than three (3) single space 
exam book size pages. 
QUESTION 1: 
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Petitioners, defendants below, hereinafter called defendants, seek mandamus to 
compel the respondent District Court judge to strike the demand for a jury trial 
upon,and to hear and determine in equity? the claim of the complaint of Harold Lloyd 
Corporation, plaintiff below, for money damages to it for an infringement by the 
three defendants of plaintiff's copyright of its photoplay "The Freshman." Defen-
dents contend in support of the Court of Appeals power to issue the writ, that the 
District Court's order for trial as at . common 1m., by jury is beyond its jurisdiction 
and that by assuming it the court prevents an appeal from any full consideration by 
the court on the equitable issues. 
The complaint, complying tYith Rule lOeb) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, sets forth three sets of transactions upon each 
of which plaintiff has a claim for relief (a) that the three defendants have 
infringed and that the infringement has destroyed the '!alue of p1.aintiff's photoplay 
and injured plaintiff in the amount of $500,000 general and $500,000 special damages, 
for which it claims money judgment; (b) that defendant Universal Pictures Corporation 
has appropriated the copyrighted matter and haS re~duced it at a profit, for which 
plaintiff claims an accounting as if defendant were a trustee for plaintiff, and 
(c) that the latter defendant has infringed and intends to continue to infringe, for 
which plaintiff claims that defendant should be enjoined from so continuing in the 
wrongdoing. The destruction of the prints of the infringing photoplay also was 
demanded. The transaction constituting claim (a) for money damages is set forth as 
a separate cause of action in the first count of the complaint. The transactions 
for accounting and injunction and destruction of the prints are in a second count. 
Plaintiff demanded a jury trial on the first transaction. 
The district judge ruled that he would commit the trial of the first cause of 
action to a jury to be tried as at common law. The judge's return to the order to 
show cause in the mandamus proceeding also states that simultaneously he ,07111 try, 
Without the jury, the second and third causes of action lIto the extent practicable." 
Rule 8 (a) PRCP pro~~des: 
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, vlhether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or t h ird-party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain s ~atement of the group-ds upon which the court I s jurisdiction 
depends, unless the cour t already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new 
grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3)" a demand for judgment for 
the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of 
several different types may be demanded. 
Rule 10 (b) PRCP provides: 
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. All averments of claim or defense shall 
be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as 
far as practicable to a state~ent of a single s e t of circumstances; and a paragraph 
may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon 
a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be 
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear 
presentation of the matters set forth. 
Rule 38 (a), (b) , (c) FRCP provides: 
(a) Right Preserved. The r t ght of tr i al by jury as declared by the Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall 
be preserved to the parties inviolate. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at 
any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the 
service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such deMand may be indorsed 
upon a pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: Specification of Issues. In his demand a party may specify the 
issues which he uishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial 
t-y jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only 
some of the issues, any other party within 10 days after service of the dereand or 
such lesser time as the court may order, May serve a demand for trial by jury of 
any other or all of the issues of fact in the action. 
Rule 42 (b) PRCP provides : 
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may 
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim , counterclaim, or third-party 
claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared 
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United 
States. 
State the question (or questions) presented. How should the Circuit Court of 
Appeals rule on the petition for ~Y;rit of mandamus and why? 
Question 2: 
An action was filed in the Circuit Court of Harion County, Oregon to recover 
damages for injuries alleged to have been received by plaintiff lvhile a passenger 
on one of defendant's passenger trains, which was wrecked by the falling of the 
bridge or trestle-work across the marsh known as "Lake Labish,tI in Harion County. 
The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum of 
$15,000, from which defendant appeals. assigning as error the action of the court 
m overruling the defendants challenge for cause of one John Iler, a juror who was 
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ultimately eliminated from the trial jury by the defendant by a peremptory strike. 
The voir dire examination revealed the follm.ying: 
The juror Iler~ in his examination in chief by defendant's counsel, said that 
he did not know the plaintiff& Had heard nothing about this case. Had 
heard considerable talk about the wreck. Read of it in the newspapers, and 
heard persons talk about it, who claimed to have looked at and examined the 
wreck. From what he had heard the persons say who had examined the l-1reck, 
and what he saw in the ne~o1spapers , he had formed and expressed an opinion as 
to whether the railroad company was to blame for the wreck. Have that 
opinion now. Don't know that it is a particularly fixed opinion. It is one 
that would require some evidenCE:: to remove. Could not say how many persons 
he had heard talk about the ~vreck, who had examined and looked at it, but 
supposed, perhaps, a half dozen. They said what they supposed caused the 
wreck. They were persons whom he had respect for. From what they said and 
vyhat he read in the ne\o1Spapers he had formed an opinion as to the cause of 
the wreck. Rad heard the various theories put forth through the newspapers, 
as to whether the ,,,reck was caused by a defective structure , or by a rail 
being removed from the track by some evil-disposed person. At the conclusion 
of his examination by counsel the juror , in response to questions by the 
court, said that Hhat he had heard about the transaction was not from any of 
the witnesses in the case, but just from persons ~Yho had gone to view the 
wreck; that no opinion he had formed "'0uld influence his judgment in the 
trial of the case, but he should try the case impartially, according to the 
law and the evidence ; that he could ~isregard 't"hat he had heard about the 
wreck, and would be governed by the evidence altogether ; would not regard 
what he had heard, as it was only hearsay ; would pay no attention to what he 
had been told, but v ould sinply be guided by the testimony given in the 
court. The challenge was thereupon overruled by the court, defendant excepting. 
State the question (or questions) presented. How the Supreme Court of 
Oregon should rule on the assignment of error, and ~Yhy? 
!hIes tion 3: 
Plaintiff, while in the employ of the Simmons Mar·.!facturing Company, suffered 
~ injury to his left eye. Thereafter he commenced an action against said 
Company to recover damages for the injury sustained. The defendant herein, 
3 
Aetna Insurance Company, appeared in that action (l07hich is still pending) for 
the Simmons }fanufacturing Company, in accordance wi th a contract of indemnity 
with such Company. As soon as plaintiff recovered from his injury he resuned 
his employment and continued it until Harch, 1911, at ~07hich ti~e he was discharged. 
This second action by plaintiff was brought against the defendant, Aetna 
Insurance Company, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason 
of the action of the defendant in procuring the discharge of plaintiff from his 
employment because of his refusal to settle his personal injury claim in accor-
dance with the terms of the defendant insurance company. The answer denied the 
material allegations of the complaint. 
The evidence tended to shrnv that a short time before the plaintiff was 
discharged, an agent of the defendant , Aetna Insurance Cor:;pany, called upon 
fir. Vincent, the general manager of the Simmons Nanufacturing Company, and 
suggested to hi~ that the plaintiff be discharged. Following this interview, and 
on February 28, 1911 , the agent of the defendant wrote a letter addressed to 
"Hr. H. H. Vincent, The Sinrnons Hfg. Co., Kenosha, Fis., II as follows: 
"Dear Sir : 
Confirming our intervieH this morning regarding the above-entitled 
matter, I lyish to call your attention to the fact that this injured has 
brought suit against your company, and the further fact that he is still 
in your employ. This situation , while it is one which is immaterial to 
us, and in no way affects us or affects the question of the injured's 
right to recover, is one which is full of possibilities of trouble to 
your company for the following reasons: It has the tende~cy to encourage 
litigation against your co~pany by your employees for the reason that 
they feel that they can !'take a chance" at obtaining a judgment after 
they are injured and still lose nothing in the way of being out of 
employment. It furthermore gives them the opportunity to collect the 
necessary money with which to fight a lawsuit; in other words, you are 
furnishing them "sinews of war" vIi th which to fight yourself. Hhile it 
is true, as you suggested, that the effect of shmJing that the company 
considers the matter one ~"hich they are fighting as a t'}atter of principle; 
and that because they are r1g~t, the company is not small enough to 
consider the fact that a man is fighting it a reason f.or discharging 
him, still these facts could not under our rules of evidence be shown 
at the time the matter is tried for the reason that they are irrelevant. 
We wish merely to call this fact to your attentions, so that you may 
consider whether it is in accord with your best interests that your 
employees get the idea that they can up..dertake to collect damages from 
you and at the same time remain in your employ, earning money with 
which to injure you. As for ourselves, as I have stated to you, ~Je are 
not interested one way or t~e other. It is entirely immaterial to us, 
and we make no recommendations one way or the other. We merely submit 
the matter to your good judgment. " 
Simmons testified that he was not present at the interview with the 
defendant's agent; that he never smy the letter until a short time before the 
trial; that he knew nothing of the request made by the defendant; and that he 
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ordered the plaintiff discharged on his own motion, and not because of any action 
taken by the defendant. His evidence v!as corroborated by t.he general super-
intendent, Vincent. The conference and correspondence beb~een the represen-
tatives of the defendant and the Simmons Nanufacturing Company were all ~"i th 
Vincent, the general superintendent of that company. He testified that they 
had nothing whatever to do with the discharge, and in effect that he paid no 
attention to the request. He said that such requests, verbal or written were 
never called to Simmons' attention, and that the letter suggesting plaintiff's 
discharge was written to hi~. personally , and was placed in a file in which he 
kept correspondence dealing wi th matters that came under his charge . He 
further testified that he ~olas directed ~y Simmons to discharge the plaintiff 
before the matter came up ~o1ith the insurance company. He conRtrued the 
direction as allm-ring h:tm SOl:le discretion. Personally he thought it bad policy 
to discharge employees who had brought suit against the company, so he allowed 
Johnson to remain. Later Simmons saw Johnson at work in the shop, and peremptorily 
ordered his discharge, and plaintiff was dismissed because of this order. 
Simmons testified to substantially the same state of facts, and very definitely 
stated that he knew nothing of any request having been made by the defendant for 
p:'aintiff's discharge. His reason for ordering it, as stated by him, ~'7as that he 
had had some disastrous experiences from retaining men in his employment with 
whom he ~>1as havin~ a lawsuit, and he had d.ecided to pursue a different policy. 
These two witnesses were cross-examined at great length~ and t here was no 
conflict whatever in their testimony. Nor ~vas any other testimony offered by 
plaintiff contradicting the testimony of Simmons and Vincent. 
At the time both the defendant and the plaintiff rested, a motion for a 
directed verdict was made by defendant, which the trial court denied. 
The jury answered all of the questions in the special verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff, and among othe ,' things found that plaintiff's discharge ~!as 
proximately caused by the defendant. The jury assessed the plaintiff's com-
pensatory damages at $294 and his punitive damages at $5,000. 
Defendant moved for judgment n.o.v., which motion was denied. The defen-
dant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Hisconsin, assif,!ling as error the 
trial courts denial of its two motions. 
State the question (or questions ) presented. How should the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin rule on defendant's assignments of error, and why? 
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Question 4: 
This case came to the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of 
certiorari granted to review a judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia that affirmed a conviction of the petitioner of doing 
business as a pawnbroker and charging more than six per cent interest, without 
a license, which is forbidden by the Act of Congr~ss of February 4, 1913, c. 
26, 37 Stat. 657. 48 App.~.C. 380. 
The external facts are not disputed. The defendant had been in business as 
a pawnbroker in Hashington but anticipating the enactment of the present law 
removed his headquarters to a place in Virginia at the other end of a bridge 
leading from the city. He continued to use his former building as a store-
house for his pledges but pOSted notices on his office there that no applications 
for loans would be received or examination of pledges made there. He did, 
hm~ever, maintain a free automobile service from there to Virginia and offered 
to intending borrowers the choice of calling upon him in person or sending their 
application and security by a d~e messenger service not belonging to him but 
established in his Hashington building. If the loan was made, in the latter 
case the money and pawn ticket were brought back and handed to the borrower in 
H'ashington. When a loan was paid off the borrower received a redemption cer-
tificate, presented it in Washington and got back his pledge. The defendant 
estimated the number of persons applying to the Hashington office for loans or 
redemption at fifty to seventy-five a day. His l\fashington clerk, a witness in 
his behalf, put it at from seventy-five to one hundred. 
The foregoing evidence was undisputed: the assignment of error related to 
the charge of the U. S. District Court Judge to the jury. 
The judge said to the jury that the only question for them to determine 
was whether they believed the concurrent testiBony of the witnesses for the 
Government and the defendant describing the course of business stated above, 
and as to which there was no dispute. Those facts, he correctly instructed them, 
constituted an engaging in business in the District of Columbia. This was 
excepted to and the jury retired. The next day they were recalled to Court 
and were told that there really was no issue of fact for them to decide; that 
they were not warranted in capriciously saying that the witnesses for the 
Gover~ent anc the defendant were not telling the truth; that the course of 
dealing constituted a breach of the law ; that it vas their duty to accept this 
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were sure he could ride with the sheriff. He saw the sheriff and asked if he 
could ride to the dance with hil!l, and was advised that he could. He did ride 
to the dance in the sheriff's automobile. He sat in the back seat, the sheriff 
and his wife sitting in the front seat. His two friends immediately followed 
behind the sheriff's automobile in their car. The sheriff was going to this dance 
for the purpo$e of preserving order, and, upon arriving thereat, the sheriff went 
about his official duties. T.~e juror danced once with the sheriff's wife, and, 
rather early in the evening, returned to Haupaca \vith his two friends in their 
automobile. The affiants declared that nothing was said about the case, and 
that no attempt was made in any way, shape, or manner to influence the juror's 
judgment, either by the sheriff, or by his wife or by anyone else. There was 
no evidence to the contrary. 
The record in the case showed that from the time of the commission of the 
alleged rape the sheriff and his office staff had been active in procuring 
evidence to establish defendants guilt, and the sheriff testified as a witness 
for the State. 
Section 3072-m of the Wisconsin Code provided in brief that no new trial shall 
be granted by the Supreme Court "on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or 
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or 
procedure," unless it shall appear that the error complained of has affected the 
substantial rights of a party seeking reversal. 
State the question (or questions) presented. How the court should rule on 
the motion and why? 
